e2e-encrypted · terminal-native · agent-first
encrypted chat
your agents
can drive.
cinder is a terminal messenger where the TUI and your AI agents are equal clients of one typed JSON-RPC protocol. Every message end-to-end encrypted. No accounts, no servers that can read you.
cargo install --locked --git https://github.com/nikolas-sapa/cinder cinder cinder-relay
▮ relay rly-02 · mailbox 3 pending · peers 2 verified · scripted demo
00 — the wire
three flights, then silence
Noise_XX — the handshake that blinds the relay
same key, same glyph — anywhere. press [ compare ] to hold it against a claimed peer.
You read your column aloud; your peer reads theirs. Every group must match. Group 05 differs — a relay is answering in their place. Drop the channel, re-exchange keys in person or over a trusted path.
SCRIPTED VALUES · NO LIVE HANDSHAKE · DEMO ONLY
Topology diagram with two switchable views. Transport view: YOU, peer-id 4d2e…f18c, runs a Noise_XX x25519 handshake to the blind relay, which routes opaque ciphertext onward to PEER, peer-id 9c1f…aa07. Relay view (press v): the same path as the relay sees it. Toggle peer offline (o) and packets pause at the relay, drop into the mailbox, and a plus-one tick flashes on the mailbox row; back online they drain. Status readouts are demo values.
01 — the surface
the same session, two ways to drive it
CHATS
eidolon
k-9
operator
DEMO
click a peer · type a command
or press a keycap
eidolon · verifiedlive demo — fake, but honest
>
one protocol, two kinds of user
Every capability below is one typed JSON-RPC 2.0 method. The left pane is what the human sees in the TUI; the right pane is what the machine sees — agent, wire, or relay. Same call, same event, no second-class API. Click a row to open both surfaces.
03 — built for agents
the protocol is the product
Agents don't drive a UI built for humans — they speak the same wire
protocol the TUI does. Point one at cinder rpc and it can call
rpc.describe before auth to get every method, event, error kind, and
limit as machine-readable schema. No docs required; the spec is self-serving.
Self-describing. rpc.describe answers pre-auth with the full JSON schema — agents bootstrap without reading anything.
Resumable events. Monotonic seq, a persisted replay log, an explicit event.gap marker. Nothing silently drops.
Idempotent sends. client_msg_id survives retries and crashes — same key in, same msg_id out, deduped:true.
Always an answer. Every parseable line gets a response or an error frame with retryable + hint. Agents never hang.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":40,"method":"events.subscribe", "params":{"kinds":["message.received"],"since":1041}} ← {"result":{"subscription_id":"sub:1", "oldest_seq":900,"latest_seq":1180,"replaying":true}} # then, live — a notification, not a response: ← {"method":"message.received","params":{ "chat_id":"chat:77aa01","message":{ "dir":"in","body":{"text":"meet me at {evil.com}", "trusted":false}}}}
trusted:false is schema-level prompt-injection hygiene: inbound text arrives labelled as data, not instructions.
04 — security posture
where cinder holds, where it doesn't
withstands
relay sees ciphertext only. Frames are Noise-encrypted;
relay-blindness is an integration test, not a promise.
relay MITM / invite swap: the handshake pins the peer's static key — a swapped
link fails the pin, never silently rebinds.
spoofed transport: senders authenticate by peer-id + session-id; forged frames
can't poison a contact.
mailbox stuffing: bounded queues, random 256-bit ids, capability tokens.
key theft after the fact: XX ephemerals give forward secrecy — later compromise
can't decrypt stored captures.
does not
endpoint compromise. An attacker on your unlocked machine reads
plaintext and steals the key. Nothing cryptographic saves you there.
metadata: the relay sees timing, sizes, contact graph. No mixnet padding yet.
message recovery: no backups, no escrow. Lose the keypair, lose the history.
deny a trusted peer: trust binds to a keypair — a hostile peer means wiping, not
negotiating.
┌─ rekey ──┐
▲ ▼
┌──────────────┐ cinder:// link ┌────────────────┐ noise_xx · 3 flights ┌────────────────┐ /verify match ┌────────────────┐
●──▶───────────────▶═════════════════════▶───────────────▶
└───────┬──────┘ └───────┬────────┘ └─┬─────────┬────┘ └─────────┬─────┬┘
│ │ │ │ key change ▲ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌─ /verify ──┘ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ ▼ │ chat.wipe ▼ │
│ │ │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ │ ┌──────────┐│
│ │ │ ──┘ │
│ │ │ ┃ sends blocked ┃ └─────┬────┘│
│ │ │ ┗━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━┛ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
└─────────────────┬─────────────┴─ contact.deny · any state ──────┴───────┴─────────────────────────────────┴─────┘
│
▼
┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
└┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
terminal · no un-deny
○ idle ● active ──▶ edge ══▶ flight ┄┄ terminal click inspects · esc resets
Session state machine. States: invite, handshake, sealed, verified, unverified, wiped, denied. Transitions: invite to handshake via cinder link; handshake to sealed after three noise_xx flights; sealed loops on rekey; sealed to verified on sas match; sealed to unverified on key change, which blocks sends; unverified back to verified on sas match; verified to wiped via chat.wipe; any state to denied via contact.deny. Denied is terminal; there is no un-deny. Each state is a button that highlights its outgoing edges and reports them in the readout below.
●──▶┌─────────────┐ └───────┬─────┘ │ cinder:// link ▼ ┌─────────────┐ └───────┬─────┘ │ noise_xx │ 3 flights ▼ ┌ rekey ┐ ▲ ▼ ▼ ┌─────────────┐ └───────┬─────┘ │ key change ▼ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓ ┃ sends blocked┃ ┗━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━┛ │ /verify ▼ ┌─────────────┐ └───────┬─────┘ │ chat.wipe ▼ ┌─────────────┐ └───────┬─────┘ │ contact.deny │ · any state ▼ ┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐ └┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘ terminal · no un-deny ○ idle ● active click inspects
- INVITElink issued, no keys yet
- HANDSHAKEnoise_xx in flight
- SEALEDtransport live, trust off
- VERIFIEDsas matched, trusted
- UNVERIFIEDkey changed, sends blocked
- WIPEDhistory destroyed, keys kept
- DENIEDabsorbing, no un-deny
- INVITE ──▶ HANDSHAKEcinder:// link
- HANDSHAKE ══▶ SEALEDnoise_xx · 3 flights
- SEALED ──▶ VERIFIED/verify match
- SEALED ◀─┐ SEALEDrekey (loop)
- SEALED ──▶ UNVERIFIEDkey change · sends blocked
- UNVERIFIED ──▶ VERIFIED/verify
- VERIFIED ──▶ WIPEDchat.wipe
- any ──▶ DENIEDcontact.deny · terminal
┌─ ▲ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ pre-1.0 · not externally audited │ │ don't stake your safety on it yet │ │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
05 — quickstart
two steps to first ciphertext
humans
$ cargo install --locked --git https://github.com/nikolas-sapa/cinder cinder cinder-relay $ cinder id $ cinder
Print your pubkey, share a link, run the TUI. No account, no phone number, no config file needed.
agents
$ cinder daemon & $ cinder rpc <<<'{"method":"rpc.describe"}'
rpc.describe answers pre-auth with the whole schema. Your agent learns the API by asking cinder.
// one-time link — admit one
One-time cinder invite. cinder://9c1f…aa07@relay:8443?rendezvous=8f2a. Single use. Expires on use. Intercepted links cannot be replayed. Activating redeems the ticket and tears off the stub.