e2e-encrypted · terminal-native · agent-first

encrypted chat
your agents
can drive.

cinder is a terminal messenger where the TUI and your AI agents are equal clients of one typed JSON-RPC protocol. Every message end-to-end encrypted. No accounts, no servers that can read you.

protocol v1 · noise_xx
rust · mit · ~14k loc

cargo install --locked --git https://github.com/nikolas-sapa/cinder cinder cinder-relay
get started read the docs v0.9.1-pre

Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s blind relay no accounts

▮ relay rly-02 · mailbox 3 pending · peers 2 verified · scripted demo

00 — the wire

three flights, then silence

Noise_XX — the handshake that blinds the relay

YOU initiator responder PEER
e →
e fresh ephemeral, nothing else
← e
e, ee, s, es peer's static arrives already encrypted
s →
s, se your static, encrypted — pinned to peer-id
handshake_hash 7f3a…e91c then: transport frames only
PEER VERIFY // KX-9C1F X25519 · SHA-256 · DEMO VECTOR
++ ++
[ fig·04 ] · peer-fingerprint evidence mode:solo · seed 9c1f…aa07
// fingerprint matrix — computed locallyB8×8 · 16 CELL · DITHER
PEER-ID 9c1f…aa07 CELLS 16×16 · RAMP 13
…

same key, same glyph — anywhere. press [ compare ] to hold it against a claimed peer.

FP = SHA-256(PK) → 128-BIT FIELD · MIRRORED L→R MATRIX DETERMINISTIC · SWEEP DECORATIVE · DEMO VECTOR
// 02 — sas compare7 GROUPS · SPEAK ALOUD
GRPYOU READ THEY READ
01482 482
02091 091
03775 775
04340 340
05156 917≠
06823 823
07504 504
GROUP 05 ≠ — DO NOT TRUST 6/7 MATCH

You read your column aloud; your peer reads theirs. Every group must match. Group 05 differs — a relay is answering in their place. Drop the channel, re-exchange keys in person or over a trusted path.

SCRIPTED VALUES · NO LIVE HANDSHAKE · DEMO ONLY

FP = SHA-256(PK) → 128-BIT FIELD · MIRRORED L→R IGNITIONS + SWEEP DECORATIVE · MATRIX DETERMINISTIC
++ ++

Topology diagram with two switchable views. Transport view: YOU, peer-id 4d2e…f18c, runs a Noise_XX x25519 handshake to the blind relay, which routes opaque ciphertext onward to PEER, peer-id 9c1f…aa07. Relay view (press v): the same path as the relay sees it. Toggle peer offline (o) and packets pause at the relay, drop into the mailbox, and a plus-one tick flashes on the mailbox row; back online they drain. Status readouts are demo values.

[fig·03]·ciphertext path· view:transport· peer:online
[fig·03]noise_xx is end-to-end: the relay forwards opaque frames, sees timing+size only, keeps no keys · peer offline → frames queue at mailbox · readouts are demo[v] view [o] peer
[legend]▮ packet head · ▓▒░· decay trail · ┬ relay fork · +1 mailbox enqueue · ● peer up / ○ peer downmotion: reduced-safe
RELAY LINK // RLY-02 SEALED · X25519 · LIVE
// 01 — link scoperadial · persist .90
LINK SEALED · SIG −41 dB SWEEP 1.05 R/S
// 02 — channel levelatk 20ms · rel 350ms
MEDIA 50FPS · TX −6.2 / RX −9.8 dBFS PK −0.4
// 03 — throughputscroll 120ms/col
THRPT 1.24 MB/S MAILBOX 3 PEND · RTT 41 MS
ramp charcoal→ember→white 13lv · thr B8×8+IGN · cell 3/4px · values scripted — instrument demo INS-PNL-DITH-01

01 — the surface

the same session, two ways to drive it

cinder — tui

CHATS

eidolon

k-9

operator

DEMO

click a peer · type a command
or press a keycap

eidolon · verifiedlive demo — fake, but honest

>

VOICE CALL // K-9 SEALED · NOISE_XX · LIVE
CALL · 00:04:17 peer k-9 fp 4b7e…1d90 codec opus 48k rtt 41ms jit ±3ms TX · LIVE
// 01 — voice waveform TX·MIC / RX·K-9 · PERSIST .90 · SCROLL 11MS/COL
TX −7.2 dBFS · RX −11.4 dBFS NET 0.3% LOSS · SEQ 12541
keys m mute · h hold · e end
ramp charcoal→ember→white 13lv · thr B8×8+IGN · cell 4px dev · dpr ≤2 · scripted demo values CALL-PNL-DITH-02
02 — specification ledger · 07 entries · all ship today

one protocol, two kinds of user

Every capability below is one typed JSON-RPC 2.0 method. The left pane is what the human sees in the TUI; the right pane is what the machine sees — agent, wire, or relay. Same call, same event, no second-class API. Click a row to open both surfaces.

signal path · calls verified
event flow · push, no poll verified
no human-only calls · no agent-only calls · parity 7/7

03 — built for agents

the protocol is the product

Agents don't drive a UI built for humans — they speak the same wire protocol the TUI does. Point one at cinder rpc and it can call rpc.describe before auth to get every method, event, error kind, and limit as machine-readable schema. No docs required; the spec is self-serving.

Self-describing. rpc.describe answers pre-auth with the full JSON schema — agents bootstrap without reading anything.

Resumable events. Monotonic seq, a persisted replay log, an explicit event.gap marker. Nothing silently drops.

Idempotent sends. client_msg_id survives retries and crashes — same key in, same msg_id out, deduped:true.

Always an answer. Every parseable line gets a response or an error frame with retryable + hint. Agents never hang.

→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":40,"method":"events.subscribe",
   "params":{"kinds":["message.received"],"since":1041}}
← {"result":{"subscription_id":"sub:1",
   "oldest_seq":900,"latest_seq":1180,"replaying":true}}

# then, live — a notification, not a response:
← {"method":"message.received","params":{
   "chat_id":"chat:77aa01","message":{
     "dir":"in","body":{"text":"meet me at {evil.com}",
             "trusted":false}}}}

trusted:false is schema-level prompt-injection hygiene: inbound text arrives labelled as data, not instructions.

events.subscribe · since:1041 · live SEQ 1180
EVT-LOGSEQ-METER
info warn danger ramp charcoal→ember→white 13lv · thr B8×8+IGN · fake scripted frames · loops EVT-DITH-01

04 — security posture

where cinder holds, where it doesn't

withstands

relay sees ciphertext only. Frames are Noise-encrypted; relay-blindness is an integration test, not a promise.
relay MITM / invite swap: the handshake pins the peer's static key — a swapped link fails the pin, never silently rebinds.
spoofed transport: senders authenticate by peer-id + session-id; forged frames can't poison a contact.
mailbox stuffing: bounded queues, random 256-bit ids, capability tokens.
key theft after the fact: XX ephemerals give forward secrecy — later compromise can't decrypt stored captures.

does not

endpoint compromise. An attacker on your unlocked machine reads plaintext and steals the key. Nothing cryptographic saves you there.
metadata: the relay sees timing, sizes, contact graph. No mixnet padding yet.
message recovery: no backups, no escrow. Lose the keypair, lose the history.
deny a trusted peer: trust binds to a keypair — a hostile peer means wiping, not negotiating.

fsm-02 session · transport · trust interactive · edge trace
                                                                                ┌─ rekey ──┐
                                                                                ▲          ▼
    ┌──────────────┐ cinder:// link ┌────────────────┐ noise_xx · 3 flights ┌────────────────┐ /verify match  ┌────────────────┐
●──▶───────────────▶═════════════════════▶───────────────▶
    └───────┬──────┘                └───────┬────────┘                      └─┬─────────┬────┘                └─────────┬─────┬┘
            │                               │                                 │         │ key change               ▲    │     │
            │                               │                                 │         │           ┌─ /verify   ──┘    │     │
            │                               │                                 │         │           │                   │     │
            │                               │                                 │         ▼           │         chat.wipe ▼     │
            │                               │                                 │ ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓  │             ┌──────────┐│
            │                               │                                 │ ──┘             │
            │                               │                                 │ ┃  sends blocked ┃                └─────┬────┘│
            │                               │                                 │ ┗━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━┛                      │     │
            │                               │                                 │       │                                 │     │
            └─────────────────┬─────────────┴─ contact.deny · any state ──────┴───────┴─────────────────────────────────┴─────┘
                              │
                              ▼
                      ┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
                      
                      └┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
                      terminal · no un-deny

    ○ idle    ● active    ──▶ edge    ══▶ flight    ┄┄ terminal    click inspects · esc resets

Session state machine. States: invite, handshake, sealed, verified, unverified, wiped, denied. Transitions: invite to handshake via cinder link; handshake to sealed after three noise_xx flights; sealed loops on rekey; sealed to verified on sas match; sealed to unverified on key change, which blocks sends; unverified back to verified on sas match; verified to wiped via chat.wipe; any state to denied via contact.deny. Denied is terminal; there is no un-deny. Each state is a button that highlights its outgoing edges and reports them in the readout below.

fsm-02 session · rail interactive
●──▶┌─────────────┐
    
    └───────┬─────┘
            │ cinder:// link
            ▼
    ┌─────────────┐
    
    └───────┬─────┘
            │ noise_xx
            │ 3 flights
            ▼
        ┌ rekey  ┐
        ▲   ▼    ▼
    ┌─────────────┐
    
    └───────┬─────┘
            │ key change
            ▼
       ┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
       
       ┃ sends blocked┃
       ┗━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━┛
                │ /verify  
                ▼
    ┌─────────────┐
    
    └───────┬─────┘
            │ chat.wipe
            ▼
    ┌─────────────┐
    
    └───────┬─────┘
            │ contact.deny
            │ · any state
            ▼
    ┌┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┐
    
    └┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┄┘
      terminal · no un-deny

    ○ idle   ● active   click inspects
inspect· · ·
transition register
states
  • INVITElink issued, no keys yet
  • HANDSHAKEnoise_xx in flight
  • SEALEDtransport live, trust off
  • VERIFIEDsas matched, trusted
  • UNVERIFIEDkey changed, sends blocked
  • WIPEDhistory destroyed, keys kept
  • DENIEDabsorbing, no un-deny
edges · hover to trace
  • INVITE ──▶ HANDSHAKEcinder:// link
  • HANDSHAKE ══▶ SEALEDnoise_xx · 3 flights
  • SEALED ──▶ VERIFIED/verify match
  • SEALED ◀─┐ SEALEDrekey (loop)
  • SEALED ──▶ UNVERIFIEDkey change · sends blocked
  • UNVERIFIED ──▶ VERIFIED/verify
  • VERIFIED ──▶ WIPEDchat.wipe
  • any ──▶ DENIEDcontact.deny · terminal
┌─ ▲ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                                                        │
│  pre-1.0 · not externally audited                      │
│  don't stake your safety on it yet                     │
│                                                        │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

05 — quickstart

two steps to first ciphertext

humans

$ cargo install --locked --git https://github.com/nikolas-sapa/cinder cinder cinder-relay
$ cinder id
$ cinder

Print your pubkey, share a link, run the TUI. No account, no phone number, no config file needed.

agents

$ cinder daemon &
$ cinder rpc <<<'{"method":"rpc.describe"}'

rpc.describe answers pre-auth with the whole schema. Your agent learns the API by asking cinder.

cinderd — tty0
click panel pause · press s to skip · stays static when done

// one-time link — admit one

++ ++

One-time cinder invite. cinder://9c1f…aa07@relay:8443?rendezvous=8f2a. Single use. Expires on use. Intercepted links cannot be replayed. Activating redeems the ticket and tears off the stub.

click the ticket burns the link · intercepted copies can't replay